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Abstract: The aim of this work was to investigate the role of the cognitive system and the affective system on 
adolescents’ risk taking in gambling tasks characterized as different on the basis of information given to 
decision makers. In Study 1, we explored the role of probabilistic reasoning and sensation seeking on decision 
making in a non-risky context (Non-Gambling Task) and a risky context (Gambling Task) in which no 
preliminary information were given to participants. Results showed that adolescents referred to probabilistic 
reasoning only in the Non-Gambling Task. In Study 2, we explored the role of probabilistic reasoning and 
sensation seeking in risky situations with preliminary information given to participants. Specifically, we 
compared a risky context characterized by high-emotional arousal (Game of Dice Task), in which a feedback 
after each decision was given, with one characterized by low-emotional arousal (Game of Dice Task – 
Modified version), without feedback. Probabilistic reasoning characterized adolescents’ decision making 
regardless of feedback. Findings showed that adolescents’ decision making was solely linked to the cognitive 
system in the non-risky situation, and the affective system overcomes the cognitive system in situation of risk. 
Moreover, providing information about the task might interfere with the imbalance between the two systems. 
Keywords: adolescents, risk taking, gambling, decision making, probabilistic reasoning, sensation seeking. 
 
Introduction 
Adolescence is characterized by risky behavioral decisions such as driving without seatbelts, 
carrying weapons, using illicit drugs and alcohol, and engaging in unprotected sex (Reyna, Chapman, 
Dougherty, & Confrey, 2012). Recent neurobiological models suggested that two distinct brain 
systems (i.e., dual-system theory) are involved in decision making and risk taking in adolescence 
(see Sommerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010, for more details): A cognitive control system or cognitive 
system and a socio-emotional system or affective system (Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & 
Steinberg, 2011). Some differences can be identified between them. While the cognitive system is 
the neural basis of deliberating processing, which is effortful and controlled, and operates according 
to formal rules of logic (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004), affecting processing is spontaneous and 
automatic, and operates by principles of similarity and contiguity. The cognitive system is also the 
neural basis of inhibitory control, a mechanism that can block affective impulses and therefore 
enables deliberative decision making even in affect-charged situations (Cohen, 2005; Knock & Fehr, 
2007; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). On the contrary, the affective system 
influences behavior by affective impulses (Weber et al., 2004). Finally, the two systems have been 
shown to mature at different speeds. The affective system matures rapidly at puberty, whereas the 
cognitive system matures later and more gradually over the course of adolescence (Casey, Jones, & 
Hare, 2008; Steinberg, 2008).   
During adolescence, the two systems affects youth’s decision making process. In fact, the 
cognitive system supports decision making process through the inhibition of impulsive behavior, 
whereas the affective system relies on subjective evaluation that only takes into account potential 
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rewards of the risky choices. Due to both the relative maturity of brain structures (i.e., amygdala, 
ventral striatum, nucleus accumbens) that govern the affective system and the immaturity of the 
cognitive system (i.e., lateral prefrontal cortex), adolescence is a unique time period in which there is 
an imbalance between these two distinct brain systems (e.g., Casey et al., 2008; Sommerville et al., 
2010). Due to this imbalance, adolescents may be more likely to take risks when compared to adults 
(Chein et al., 2011). In fact, according to these kind of explanations, adolescent risk taking is the 
result of a competition between the philogenetically younger cognitive system and the 
phylogenetically older affective system (Casey et al., 2008; Cohen, 2005; Steinberg, 2008).  
Based on dual-system models’ research, two relevant claims describing decision making in 
adolescence can be drawn. The first one is that deliberating processing abilities mature earlier than 
the potential for inhibitory control in the cognitive system (Keating, 2004; Kuhn, 2006). The second 
one is that the difference in maturational speed between the cognitive and the affective system is 
assumed to result in a developmental imbalance between the systems during adolescence, with the 
affective system being easily triggered, for example by the expectation of a reward (Galván et al., 
2006; Galván, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 2007) or the presence of peers (Gardner & Steinberg, 
2005). Thus, the very active affective system is not yet sufficiently counterbalanced by the still-
maturing cognitive one.  
Following these claims, two consequences can be derived, as follows. First, as deliberating 
processing abilities mature earlier than the potential for inhibitory control in the cognitive system, 
adolescents can be expected to show a good functioning of deliberating processes in the absence of 
affective involvement. On the contrary, they can be expected to do not control affective impulses in 
situations of affective involvement, despite good deliberating processing abilities. Second, since the 
affective system is not yet sufficiently counterbalanced by the still-maturing cognitive system, 
adolescents can be assumed to be more susceptible to risk taking in situations of higher emotional 
arousal. 
Starting from these premises, the general aim of this work was to investigate the role of the 
two systems on adolescents’ risk taking in different probability-related decision making gambling 
tasks (in line with literature: see Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening & Weber, 2009; Schonberg, Fox, & 
Poldrack, 2011). In fact, one such example of risky decision making where the imbalance between 
cognition and affect is evident is in gambling.  
Excessive gambling has become a growing problem among adolescents and a recent review 
found alarming rates of problematic and pathological gambling (see Scholes-Balog, Hemphill, 
Dowling, & Toumbourou, 2014). Research has suggested that cognitive factors based on 
misunderstanding the nature of probability including a set of erroneous beliefs, irrational thoughts, 
and misperceptions (e.g., Delfabbro, Lahn, & Grabosky, 2006; Delfabbro, Lambos, King, & Puglies, 
2009; Donati, Primi, & Chiesi, 2013; Turner, Zangeneh, & Littman-Sharp, 2006), and affective 
factors, such as sensation seeking (e.g., Donati et al., 2013; Gupta & Derevensky, 1998; Nower, 
Gupta, & Derevensky, 2004), are associated with excessive gambling. Specifically, adolescent 
pathological gamblers, relative to non-pathological gamblers, are more prone to mistaken views 
about randomness and erroneous probabilistic reasoning, tend to hold erroneous beliefs about their 
chance of winning, are susceptible to biases related to gambling outcomes, and have higher levels of 
sensation seeking. 
Since the cognitive and the affective systems seem to represent respectively ‘thinking’ and 
‘affect’ domains (Reyna & Rivers, 2008), we considered probabilistic reasoning ability as ‘thinking 
variable’ and sensation seeking as ‘affect variable’. Given that risk taking was measured through 
gambling tasks, we chose those variables on the basis of the above-described predictive role of 
probabilistic reasoning (e.g., Delfabbro et al., 2006; Delfabbro et al., 2009; Donati et al., 2013; 
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Turner et al., 2006) and sensation seeking (Donati et al., 2013; Gupta & Derevensky, 1998; Nower et 
al., 2004) on adolescent problem gambling behavior.  
We also aimed to explore the role of the two systems on adolescent risky decision making in 
gambling tasks characterized as different on the basis of information given to decision makers. More 
in detail, from Brand’s model of decision making under risk (e.g., Brand, Kalbe, Labudda, Fujiwara, 
Kessler, & Markowitsch, 2005; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 2011), we know that 
different kind of decision making situations can occur in everyday life. Specifically, this model 
claims that as the level of information arises, the risk involved in the decision-making situation 
becomes more explicit: Decision making under explicit risky conditions occurs when decisions can 
be made on the basis of some knowledge about the situation and associated consequences. On the 
contrary, when a person cannot know these preliminary information, decision making occurs in a 
situation of implicit risk taking. 
Following Brand’s model of decision making under risk, one of the characteristics that 
differentiates risk taking tasks was the presence of explicit preliminary information about task 
contingencies (including for example the presentation of the number of the task trials and the 
explanation of potential consequences of each choice option). Based on this claim, we analyzed 
implicit situations of risk, intended as non-informed risky situations, since no preliminary 
information about the task contingencies were given (Study 1), and explicit situations of risk, 




The aim of the  Study 1 was to explore the role of the cognitive system and the affective 
system on adolescents’ decision making in an implicit situation of risk, i.e. a gambling condition 
without preliminary information. More specifically, we wanted to explore whether the role of 
probabilistic reasoning ability on adolescents’ decision making changed between a non-risky context 
(non-gambling condition) and a risky context (gambling condition). Our hypothesis was that 
adolescents would used their probabilistic reasoning abilities only in the non-gambling condition, 
whereas sensation seeking would affect adolescents’ decision making in the gambling condition.  
Concerning the measurement of decision-making abilities, in order to analyze adolescents’ 
choices in non-risky and risky situations, we developed two versions of an equivalent decision-
making task. Specifically, in the first version of the task, adolescents were solely requested to reason 
in probabilistic terms on a series of coin tosses sequences, while in the following version, they were 
asked to bet money on the same outcome sequences. Risky decision making was conceptualized as 
the tendency to commit the gambler’s fallacy.  
The gambler’s fallacy is one of the biases related to the representativeness heuristic, which 
indicates a tendency for people to base their judgment of the probability of a particular event on how 
much it represents the essential features of the parent population or of its generating process 
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). This fallacy occurs 
when individuals believe that even short strings of random events must correspond with their 
perception of what constitutes randomness, leading to beliefs that particular outcomes are “due” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). For example, when tossing a fair coin, after a series of heads, people 
have the feeling that a tail should follow, because this corresponds more to their expectation of 
having a mix of heads and tails, rather than a long sequence of just heads (Morsanyi, Primi, Chiesi, 
& Handley 2009). We considered the tendency to commit the gambler’s fallacy as a risk-taking 
measure since several studies showed that the susceptibility to commit this bias characterized 
adolescent problem gamblers (e.g., Delfabbro et al., 2009; Donati et al., 2013; Skoukaskas & 
Satkeviciute, 2007; Turner, Macdonald, Bartoshuk, & Zangeneh, 2008). 




Participants were 148 adolescents (62% males, mean age=15.9 years, SD=1.59) who attended 
high school in Italy (Tuscany). Written informed assent was provided by students and written 
informed consent was provided by the parents if the student was a minor.  
Instruments 
Measures. Probabilistic reasoning ability was measured with the Probabilistic Reasoning 
Questionnaire (PRQ, Primi, Morsanyi, & Chiesi,  2014). Using Item Response Theory (IRT), the 
PRQ was designed to measure proportional reasoning and basic probabilistic reasoning skills, which 
are deemed necessary to reason normatively and avoid heuristic strategies. The scale consisted of 16 
multiple-choice probabilistic reasoning questions. Items included simple, conditional, and conjunct 
probabilities, and data were presented both in frequencies and percentages (for examples: “A ball 
was drawn from a bag containing 10 red, 30 white, 20 blue, and 15 yellow balls. What is the 
probability that it is neither red nor blue?” a. 30/75; b, 10/75; c.45/75; and “60% of the population in 
a city are men and 40% are women. 50% of the men and 30% of the women smoke. We select a 
person from the city at random. What is the probability that this person is a smoker?” a. 42%, b. 
50%, c. 85%). A single composite score was computed based on the sum of correct responses. 
Sensation seeking was measured through the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS, Hoyle, 
Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 2002; Italian version: Primi, Narducci, Benedetti, 
Donati, & Chiesi, 2011). It contains eight Likert-type items using a 5-point scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree, yielding a maximum score of 40. Higher scores represent high 
levels of sensation seeking. An example of an item is “I would love to have new and exciting 
experiences, even if they are illegal”. Past studies have shown that the BSSS has adequate reliability 
and validity (Hoyle et al., 2002; Primi et al., 2011).  
Tasks. In order to compare non-gambling and gambling situations, two versions of an 
equivalent paper and pencil task were developed (Table 1).  
 Non-Gambling Task Gambling Task 
Coin Toss Sequences What is the likelihood of Tails 
at the 7th toss? 
You have €10. How much do 
you be on Tails at the 7th toss?  
H-H-T-H-T-T   
T-H-T-H-H-H   
H-T-H-T-T-T   
H-H-T-T-T-T   
T-H-T-T-H-H   
T-T-H-H-H-H   
Table 1. Non-Gambling and Gambling Tasks 
The first version was the Non-gambling Task. In this task, participants were presented with six 
different outcome sequences consisting in six coin tosses (T = Tails, H = Heads). For each sequence, 
they were asked to indicate the likelihood of Tail if a seventh toss would be made. One point was 
given to each wrong response so that higher scores corresponded to low normative reasoning. After 
participants had compiled this first task, the Gambling Task was administered. In this task, 
participants were presented with the same outcome sequences as the Non-gambling Task, but, for 
each sequence, they were asked to indicate how much money, from a minimum of €0 to a maximum 
of €10 (available for each sequence), would bet on Tails if a seventh toss would be made. A net score 
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was calculated by subtracting the average amount of money bet on the first, the third, and the fourth 
sequence (i.e. those sequences which make more likely to bet on Tails according to the gambler’s 
fallacy bias) from the average amount of money bet on the second, the fifth, and the sixth sequence 
(i.e. those sequences which make less likely to bet on Tail according to heuristic strategies). Thus, 
higher scores corresponded to high levels of susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy. 
Procedure 
Following methods of other studies (e.g., Panno, Lauriola, & Figner, 2013; Panno, Pierro, & 
Lauriola, 2013), participants were tested at two separate sessions, which were framed as two 
unrelated studies. In the first session, they completed the PRQ and the BSSS. The measures were 
administered in the classroom by professional trained experimenters. In the second session, each 
participant completed the Non-Gambling and the Gambling Task in a paper and pencil form.  
 
Results 
In line with the hypothesis, results showed that adolescents referred to probabilistic reasoning 
ability only in the Non-Gambling Task. Specifically, probabilistic reasoning ability was significantly 
and negatively related to the gambler’s fallacy in the Non-Gambling Task, indicating that 
adolescents’ performance was related to their reasoning abilities in the non-risky situation. On the 
contrary, the ability to reason with probability was no more significantly related to the performance 
in the Gambling Task, in which the susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy was significantly and 
positively related only to sensation seeking (Table 2).  
Gambler’s fallacy Probabilistic reasoning Sensation seeking 
Non-Gambling Task -.23* .11 
Gambling Task .02 .22* 
M (SD) 10.74 (3.16) 26.71 (5.70) 
Table 2. Correlations between probabilistic reasoning ability, sensation seeking, and 
gambler’s fallacy in the Non-Gambling and Gambling Tasks. (*p<.05) 
 
Discussion 
This study shows that probabilistic reasoning ability characterized adolescents’ decision 
making only in the absence of risky conditions. This result suggested that without a potential 
winning money, only the cognitive system was activated. On the contrary, once the situation became 
risky, i.e. it changes from a ‘neutral’ to an ‘affective-charged’ context by the introduction of a 
potential winning money, only sensation seeking influenced adolescents’ performance, thus 
suggesting that the affective system overcame the cognitive one in this kind of situation.  
In terms of dual-system models, findings indicate that adolescents seem to use deliberating 
processes in the absence of affective involvement, but they do not seem to control affective impulses 
in situations of affective involvement. This finding is in line with what stated by the fuzzy-trace 
theory (Chick & Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008), that assumes 
that risk taking in adolescence can be caused by a maturational lack of inhibition, particularly in 
situations of heightened emotional arousal. Moreover, our findings are also consistent with the 
revised imbalance model (Casey et al., 2008; Casey, Hare, & Galván, 2011; Galván, 2012), that 
claims that if it is true that adolescents are quite capable of rational decisions (Reyna & Farley, 
2006), in emotionally salient situations, the affective system overcomes the cognitive system. 
Further, the neural imbalance typical of adolescence also interact with the context in which 
potentially risky decisions can be made: risky choices are largely influenced by the context in which 
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they are presented (Galván, 2012). Indeed, individuals, especially adolescents, engage in risky 
choices because the context offer them a reward (Galván, 2012). It has been shown that neural 
systems that underlie reward are also those that precede risky decision making (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005; Matthews, Simmons, Lane, & Paulus, 2004), suggesting a neural link between reward 
sensitivity and risk taking.  
 
Study 2 
The aim of the Study 2 was to explore the role of the cognitive system and the affective 
system in an explicit risky situation, i.e. a gambling condition with preliminary information given to 
participants. More specifically, we wanted to explore whether the role of probabilistic reasoning 
ability on adolescents’ decision making changed between a risky context characterized by high-
emotional arousal and a risky context with low-emotional arousal. In order to design these two 
different situations, a feedback after each choice was provided in the high-emotional arousal 
situation, while no feedback was provided in the low-emotional arousal situation. We based this 
decision on Figner et al. (2009)’s results in investigating risk taking in adolescents using the 
Columbia Card Task (CCT). Providing feedback (the “hot” CCT) was found to trigger more 
affective decision making, while receiving any feedback about the result of the decision until the end 
of the session (the “cold” CCT) resulted to trigger predominantly deliberative information 
processing.  
Our first hypothesis was that adolescents would use probabilistic reasoning ability in both the 
risky situations. Indeed, from Brand and colleagues’ research on decision making under conditions of 
risk (e.g., Brand et al., 2008; Brand et al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 2011), we know that the decision 
making performance in an explicit risky context is linked to cognitive functions such as logical 
ability, executive functions (i.e. categorization, set shifting, and rule learning), and knowledge of 
probabilities. Our second hypothesis was that sensation seeking would only affect adolescents’ 
decision making in the high-emotional arousal condition, i.e. when feedback was provided. 
Concerning the decision making task, in order to test our hypothesis in a context of explicit 
decision making under risk, we used the Game of Dice Task (GDT, Brand, Fujiwara et al., 2005) 
(Figure 1), a neuropsychological task in which individuals have to decide among different 
alternatives that are explicitly linked to a specific amount of gain or loss and have obvious winning 
probabilities that are stable over time. Therefore, individuals have the chance to calculate the risk 
associated with each alternative from the very beginning of the task. As such, probabilistic reasoning 
ability should help in recognizing which option can be more likely and in reasoning about the 
likelihood of the different options. Disadvantageous performances on this task have been associated 
with impaired decision-making process in clinical populations, such as adult pathological gamblers 
(e.g., Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2005), adolescent pathological Internet gamers (Pawlikowski & Brand, 
2011), and adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Drechsler, Rizzo, & 
Steinhausen, 2008).  
 
Figure 1. The Game of Dice Task (GDT, Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005). 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 201 adolescents (61% males, mean age=16.5 years, SD=1.60) who attended 
high school in Italy (Tuscany). Written informed assent was provided by students and written 
informed consent was provided by the parents if the student was a minor.  
Instruments 
Measures. As in the first Study, probabilistic reasoning was measured with the PRQ (Primi et 
al., 2014, and sensation seeking was revealed through the Italian version of the BSSS (Primi et al., 
2011).  
Task. In order to compare high- and low-emotional arousal situations, two versions of the 
same computerized task were administered. The Game of Dice Task – original version (GDT, Brand, 
Fujiwara, et al., 2005) was used to measure risky decision making in high-emotional arousal 
situation. Before beginning this task, participants were instructed to maximize their fictitious starting 
capital of €1,000 within 18 throws of a single virtual die. They were explicitly briefed about the rules 
of the game and the amounts of money associated with each of the possible options. In each trial, 
before the die is thrown, participants must bet on the outcome of the die throw choosing among one 
of the given options: a single number, or combinations of two, three, or four numbers. If they choose 
one of the six possible single number options (from “1” to “6”, winning probability = 0.17), they 
receive a fictitious gain of €1,000 when the chosen number is thrown but a fictitious loss of €1000 
when one of the five other numbers not chosen is thrown. Choosing one of the three possible 
combinations of two numbers (“1,2” – “3,4” – “5,6”, winning probability = 0.33) is linked to a gain 
of €500 when one of the numbers included in the chosen combination is thrown, but a loss of €500 
when one of the numbers not included in those combinations is thrown. A further alternative is to 
choose one of the two possible combinations of three numbers (“1,2,3” – “4,5,6”, winning 
probability = 0.50) linked to a potential gain/loss of €200. Finally, participants may choose one of the 
three possible combinations of four numbers (“1,2,3,4” – “2,3,4,5” – “3,4,5,6”, winning probability = 
0.67) that will lead to a gain of €100 in the event that one of the four numbers chosen is thrown, but a 
loss of €100 when one of the numbers included in the other two combinations not chosen is thrown. 
In total, the participants can choose each of the 14 different alternatives (clustered in four groups) in 
each trial. The winning probabilities and amounts of gains and losses associated with each alternative 
remain stable during the entire task. After each throw, the gain or loss in money is indicated on the 
screen accompanied by a distinct sound (the jingle of a cash machine for a gain; a dull tone for a 
loss). The current total capital and number of remaining rounds are also displayed on the computer 
screen. In line with other studies (e.g., Brand, Kalbe et al., 2005; Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 
2006; Brand & Schiebener, 2013; Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, Markowitsch, &  Brand, 2010), the 
frequency of choosing the risk-disadvantageous or high risky choices (one single number and the 
two number combinations: winning probability of  0.33 or lower resulting in frequent and high losses 
in the long run) was calculated as a measure of risk taking. Thus, the higher the score, the more 
disadvantageous was the performance in terms of decision making. 
The Game of Dice Task – Modified version (GDT-MOD, Brand, 2008) was used to measure 
risky decision making in low-emotional arousal situation. The modified GDT and the original GDT 
are similar with the exception that all feedback associated features have been removed from the 
modified version. This means that the participants cannot see the number thrown in each trial, and 
gains/losses are not indicated. Additionally, the current monetary balance is fixed to the starting 
capital (€1,000), and the color bars do not show whether a loss or gain has occurred. Participants also 
do not hear a tone for gains or losses. The participants see the screen of the original task on a 
notebook (fixed to the pattern at the beginning of the task) and are instructed in the same way as in 
the original GDT. They are told that their goal in the game is to win as much money as possible and 
Donati, Chiesi & Primi 
 
to lose as little money as possible. In addition, all alternatives and gain/loss contingencies are 
explicitly explained and are indicated on the screen throughout the entire task (as in the original 
GDT). In the modified GDT, participants are told that the dice throws will not be seen on the screen 
and that they will not be informed about the outcome of each throw. They are also told that the 
computer will save the responses and that an overall feedback (final balance) will be provided at the 
end of the game. As in the GDT, the number of risky choices (i.e. one or two combinations choices) 
was calculated as a measure of risk taking.  
Procedure 
In line with Study 1, participants were tested at two separate sessions, which were framed as 
two unrelated studies. In the first session, participants completed the PRQ and the BSSS. The 
measures were administered in the classroom by professional trained experimenters. In the second 
session, each participant completed the decision making task in an individual setting on a desktop 
computer. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups. One group (n=102, 60% males, mean 
age=16.6 years, SD=1.53) was administered the GDT (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005), in which 
feedback was provided, while the other group (n=99, 62% males, mean age=16.7 years, SD=1.58) 
was administered the GDT-MOD (Brand, 2008), in which feedback was not provided.   
 
Results 
In line with our hypotheses, results showed that adolescents referred to probabilistic 
reasoning ability in both the versions of the GDT. Specifically, we found that probabilistic reasoning 
was significantly and negatively related to the frequency of risky choices in the situation with 
feedback as in the situation without feedback, indicating that adolescents’ decision making was 
related to reasoning abilities regardless of feedback. On the contrary, risky choices were significantly 
and positively related to sensation seeking only in the situation with feedback, i.e. only in conditions 
of high-emotional arousal (Table 3).  
Risky choices Probabilistic reasoning Sensation seeking 
GDT (With feedback) -.24* .20* 
M (SD) 12.71 (2.37) 25.26 (5.95) 
GDT-MOD (Without feedback) -.37** .06 
M (SD) 12.69 (2.17) 23.42 (5.57) 
Table 3. Correlations between probabilistic reasoning ability, sensation seeking, and the 
frequency of risky choices in the GDT and in the GDT-MOD. (*p<.05   **p<.01) 
Results also showed that the frequency of risky choices was significantly lower in the GDT 
(M=4.10, SD=4.25) in comparison to the GDT-MOD (M=5.78, SD=4.71) (t(199)=-2.66, p<.01, 
Cohen’s d=.37).  
 
Discussion 
Probabilistic reasoning characterized adolescents’ decision making in explicit risky 
conditions, regardless of feedback. This finding suggests that the cognitive system was activated in 
this type of risky situation, in which information about the task contingencies are given to 
participants from the beginning of the task. Only in condition of high-emotional-arousal, 
adolescents’ decision making was related to the affective system. On the contrary, in condition of 
low-emotional arousal, the affective system did not affect the decision making process. This is 
consistent with what claimed by Figner et al. (2009), according to which risky choice scenarios, such 
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as choices between monetary lotteries without outcome feedback, typically trigger only minor 
affective processes.  
The fact that adolescents' probabilistic reasoning has been found to be related to explicit 
decision making under risk provides evidence of the importance of probabilistic reasoning in 
decision making. Specifically, some Authors have said that if probabilities are not well understood it 
is likely that the choices in a risky situation will be suboptimal or too risk-seeking (Figner et al., 
2009; Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2014). Among adolescents, proportional reasoning skill, a 
prerequisite skill for correct probabilistic reasoning, is considered as a fundamental ability for 
recognizing the most advantageous choice options in decision making tasks (Huizenga, Crone, & 
Jansen, 2007; Van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Visser, & Huizenga, 2010). Also, probability estimation, 
which entails deciding which choice has the largest chance of resulting in reward, is an important 
aspect of risk perception in the decision making process (Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 
2008). Finally, probabilistic reasoning was found to mediate the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and advantageous decision making in the GDT performance among adolescents (Donati, 
Panno, Chiesi, & Primi, 2014).  
In terms of dual-system models, this study shows that adolescents seem to use deliberating 
process in situations of explicit risk. This finding is in line with what found by several studies 
conducted with adults showing the involvement of cognition in decision making under explicit risk 
(e.g., Brand et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 2011). Findings also showed that 
explicit risky condition seem to lead adolescents to control affective impulses, since the cognitive 
system is activated even in the presence of feedback and it does not seem to be overcame by the 
affective system in such emotional arousal condition.  
Finally, adolescents were found to choose more frequently the risky alternatives in the task 
version without feedback. This finding is in line with the study of Brand and colleagues (2009) 
conducted with healthy adults and revealing that participants who performed the original GDT 
showed a less disadvantageous decision making performance than those who performed the modified 
GDT. Consistent with that result, our study confirms that even in adolescents, processing feedback 
from previous trials may improve performance in a decision-making situation with explicit and stable 
rules for gains and losses.  
 
General Discussion 
This work offers empirical evidence that although adolescents’ decision making was solely 
linked to the cognitive system in the non-risky situation, the affective system overcomes the 
cognitive system when the decision making situation becomes risky, i.e. when a potential winning 
money was introduced. Additionally, it suggests that providing information about the task might 
interfere with the imbalance between the two systems that usually verifies in the presence of risky 
situations. This would explain why adolescents’ decision making in the condition with feedback was 
related not only to the affective, but also to the cognitive system, while, without feedback, 
adolescents’ performance was solely related to the cognitive system. Moreover, it indicates that 
providing feedback was associated with less risk taking than not providing it. 
From a general standpoint, the present work shows that adolescent decision making seems to 
be impaired in situations of implicit risk taking, and this impairment seems to be related to a 
difficulty in inhibiting affective impulses. However, when the risky situation becomes more explicit, 
i.e. information about the task contingencies are given, adolescents use their cognitive system; 
moreover, this system seems to be activated even in the situation of heightened emotional arousal, 
i.e. when a feedback after each choice was provided.  
Findings underline the importance of the context in interacting with the imbalance between 
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the cognitive and the affective system in influencing adolescents’ decision making in risky situations 
(Galván, 2012). Indeed, when the level of information available on the decision-making task became 
more explicit for adolescents, they showed to refer to their cognitive abilities in terms of probabilistic 
reasoning skills.  
From the educational point of view, the most important finding of this work was that 
providing explicit information on pros and cons of choice options can lead adolescents to use the 
cognitive system. However, a cognitive decision making can occur only in situation of low-
emotional arousal. Then, preventive interventions designed to reduce adolescents’ risk-taking 
behaviors should be addressed to educate adolescents to approach risk-taking contexts as much as 
possible as reasoning contexts. In other words, it would be interesting to develop educational 
interventions aimed not only at promoting the development of adolescents’ understanding of 
probability, for example by providing them real-world experiences with random generators 
(Morsanyi, Handley, & Serpell, 2012), but also at fostering their tendency to understand all the 
elements in everyday decision making situations that can be read as information on pros and cons of 
the different alternatives among which each time they have to decide. This might help them in using 
their reasoning abilities regardless of risky context.  
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